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Quotes
On developers providing a percentage of affordable housing as a planning 
obligation:
• ͞We are here to ďuild houses.  To ŵake ŵoŶey for our shareholders. Its a it 
like telling Ferrari they should give away half of their cars because some 
people ĐaŶt afford theŵ .͟  Andrew Whittaker, Home Builders Federation, 
Inside Housing, 26/2/15  
• http://www.northamptonchron.co.uk/news/local/developers-in-
northamptonshire-too-often-plead-poverty-over-money-for-cheap-
housing-firefighters-and-libraries-1-6803824
•
The scope of the presentation
• Origins of viability in the planning system
• Current policy and practice
• Viability – the concept
• Unpicking the viability model
• The viability assessment industry
• Viability and Freedom of Information
• Arguments for and against open book
• Conclusions
Viability and the Planning System
• The purpose of planning is to designate land use in the public interest.  The personal 
circumstances of the landowner, developer or user of the land or property do not 
determine its use.  Planning permission goes with the land or buildings not with the 
owner or occupier
• There has always been a fierce debate about how to capture the increase in land value 
created by the granting of planning permission.  Taxation measures failed.  The growth 
of plaŶŶiŶg gaiŶ aŶd ͞plaŶŶiŶg oďligatioŶs͟ froŵ the 7Ϭ’s.  
• Planning gain – planning obligations - were determined by policy (mitigation, mixed use, 
social facilities etc); until 2006 Guidance on Housing where there was the first mention 
of viability assessment as a test of the validity of planning obligations 
• At that time a split view - the public sector wanted to assess viability to get more in 
negotiation; from the property sector viability assessment was intended to provide less 
than the requirement of the planners
•
Viability as a planning requirement - the NPPF 2012
• ͞Plans should be deliverable. Therefore, the sites and scale of development 
should not be subject to such a scale of obligations and policy burdens that 
their ability to be developed viably is threatened.
• To ensure viability, the costs of any requirements likely to be applied to 
development should, when taking account of the normal costs of the 
development and mitigation, provide competitive returns to a willing land 
oǁŶer aŶd ǁilliŶg deǀeloper to eŶaďle the deǀelopŵeŶt to ďe deliǀeraďle͟  
(DCLG 2012, para 173).
2013/14 Review of Planning Obligations
• ͞An application may be made to the local planning authority for a revised 
affordable housing obligation.  This application should contain revised 
affordable housing proposals, based upon prevailing viability and should be 
supported ďy releǀaŶt ǀiaďility eǀideŶĐe͟ Para ϲ Reǀieǁ aŶd Appeal.  This 
measure is to apply until 2016
• The developer will need to demonstrate to the local planning authority and to 
the Planning Inspectorate on Appeal that the affordable housing obligation as 
currently agreed makes the scheme unviable in current market conditions͟ 
Para 11 Growth and Infrastructure Act 2013
• It provides a Review and Appeal system if local authorities are unwilling to 
agree to lower levels of affordable housing contributions. 
• Recent change to exclude all planning obligations for housing developments 
under 10 units and for changes of use applications  (DCLG, 2014)
Why has this happened? 
• LoŶg staŶdiŶg resistaŶĐe froŵ deǀelopers to paǇiŶg ͞plaŶŶiŶg gaiŶ͟ or 
section 106 contributions or obligations to the local planning authority for 
infrastructure or community facilities
• Additional pressure from developers to reduce obligations because of the 
impact of the recession on the property market  
• GoǀerŶŵeŶt ĐoŶĐerŶ aďout housiŶg deliǀerǇ, seekiŶg to reduĐe ͞ďurdeŶs͟ 
on developers such as planning obligations under the assumption that 
housing supply was limited by local authority planning obligations 
•
Why is it important?
• Government spending on affordable housing has fallen over the last 10 
years.  Developer contributions to affordable housing through section 106 
is now one of the main ways in which it is provided (Delivering Affordable 
Housing through section 106, JRF, 2006)
• Viability testing has reduced the percentage of affordable housing 
especially of social rented homes (In the Mix; The Need for a Diverse 
Supply of New Homes, Shelter, 2014, p.21)
• Viability testing of affordable housing contributions is undermining 
statutory local plan policies for affordable housing contributions (Bureau 
of Investigative Journalism, in the Guardian, 18.6.13; and see web site of 
35% Campaign in Southwark)
Viability Assessment - the concept
• What is viability in Planning?  It is the financial viability of planning proposals; it is not a 
measure of the holistic viability (sustainability) of the proposals 
• Residual land Value method is the principal method:
• Development costs Minus Development Value = Residual land value
• The level of RLV determines 
• (a) the land value and whether this is high enough to encourage the landowner to sell 
the site 
• ;ďͿ ǁhether the  deǀeloper ĐaŶ aĐhieǀe a ͞Đoŵpetitiǀe returŶ͟ after ͞reasoŶaďle͟ laŶd 
costs have been taken out  
• (c) to test more specifically whether the Planning Obligations required by the LA makes the sĐheŵe ͞uŶǀiaďle͟ for the deǀeloper i.e. reduĐes laŶd ǀalue too ŵuĐh for the 
landowner and developer   
Unpicking  the Viability model
• The model is a spread sheet with costs on one side of the equation and development 
value on the other
• Costs
• Build cost per sq metre
• Finance
• Professsional Fees and marketing 
• Ground Infrastructure (minus grant money)
• Developers Profit/risk
• Planning Obligations
• Development Value
• The market value of lettable space
• Market value of ground rents
• Output is RLV; or IRR (income minus outgoings) if land costs are known  
Methodological problems
• There is no agreed methodology; usual models are Three 
Dragons/GLA model; ARGUS; Developer bespoke models   
• Models are highly sensitive to input data e.g. construction costs; 
sales prices; finance costs; fees.  These data are scheme specific not 
standardised in the model   -a small change in one can make a big 
impact on RLV, profit and viability  i.e. there is a wide distribution of 
probable viability values so that results can be easily manipulated.
• How do we know what level of RLV is sufficient to make the scheme ǀiaďle?   It ŵust geŶerate a ͞Đoŵpetitiǀe returŶ to a ǁilliŶg laŶdoǁŶer aŶd deǀeloper .͟  But ǁho deĐides ǁhat leǀel is 
competitive? 
Some Specific problems with the model
• Convention on using current prices for construction costs and house prices 
can be very misleading
• Construction costs are consistently higher in the models than in actuality
• Where RLV or IRR are based on cash flow over the long time scales that 
are normal in development they are unreliable.  
• Average viability figures for large sites are not meaningful
• A viability assessment for an initial planning application does not reflect 
the reality of subsequent land trading in the market place
• 20% profit for the developer (as convention) is highly contentious 
particularly in booming markets   (actually 12-15% is sufficient for 
developers in most parts of the country)
The Viability Industry
• So great are the financial benefits of reducing planning obligations, there is a  
͞ǀiaďilitǇ IŶdustrǇ͟ of ĐoŶsultaŶts selliŶg their skills iŶ reduĐiŶg deǀeloper 
obligations; and agents getting incentives for reducing them 
• There is an incentive for developers and their agents to systematically 
undervalue their schemes
• For example, Section 106 Management Ltd. Advertises their services in this 
ǁaǇ: ͞Is Ǉour sĐheŵe stalled ďǇ diffiĐult ŵarket ĐoŶditioŶs?  WhǇ Ŷot use the 
time, otherwise wasted reviewing your section 106 payments and unilateral 
uŶdertakiŶgs, aŶd iŵproǀe the profitaďilitǇ of Ǉour sĐheŵe͟
• Some local authorities are alert to this.  For example, LB Islington is cracking 
doǁŶ oŶ ͞artifiĐiallǇ pessiŵistiĐ ǀiaďilitǇ assessŵeŶts͟ϮϬϭ4 ;LBI DisĐussioŶ 
paper on Development Viability, 2014)
Example: Greenwich Peninsula
• 121 ha. on west side of the Peninsula; Land reclamation by EP £225M
• Total scheme 10,000 housing units, 32,000sq m of commercial, plus other 
• GLA sold to Quintain then to Knight Dragon for £50m plus £50m of 
Affordable Housing Grant
• Knight Dragon asked for a  variation in the planning consent (a) To reduce 
affordable housing requirement of 38% of units in RBG policy to 25% of 
habitable rooms  (b) To change the mix of uses – 4 plots on the riverfront 
would have no affordable units
VA for Greenwich Peninsula
• VA by BNP Paribas for Knight Dragon 
• VA based on lower range of house prices in 2012; high professional 
fees (13%);  high finance costs; developer profit put in at 20%.  
Commercial space not included in the valuation.
• Independent assessment for RBG by Marsh and Co that did not 
interrogate BNP
• Full BNP report was not shown to the Planning Committee and  
community campaigners were given only a redacted version (later 
appealed to the FOI) 
• Council agreed to accept variation in full
• Result: loss of 527 affordable units at a estimated cost of £150m
• Campaigners subsequently won the FOI Tribunal releasing the un-
redacted VA.   Our own analysis suggests an undervaluation of  
£250m 
Freedom of Information Issues
• ͞There is a reasoŶ for seĐreĐy iŶ ǀiaďility studies aŶd that is house-building 
is a Đoŵpetitiǀe ŵarket͟ AŶdreǁ Whittaker HBF, IŶside HousiŶg 2ϲ.2.2ϱ.  
• ͞Deǀelopers ŵust ďe ŵade to shoǁ their suŵs.  HidiŶg ďehiŶd ĐoŵŵerĐial 
ĐoŶfideŶtiality to keep ǀiaďility assessŵeŶts seĐret is a puďiĐ ďetrayal͟
Guardian Leader Jan 1st 2015
• ͞We fiŶd it partiĐularly hard to aĐĐept that the priĐiŶg aŶd other 
assuŵptioŶs eŵďedded iŶ a ǀiaďility appraisal are ŶoŶe of the puďliĐ’s 
ďusiŶess͟ 
Freedom of Information Tribunal Decision on the Greenwich Peninsula.  
February 5th 2015
FOI Legislation
• FOI  Act 2000
• Environmental Information Regulations 2004 12 (5) (e) for larger 
schemes
• The EIR states that ͞there should ďe disĐlosure eǆĐept ǁhere the 
disclosure would adversely affect or is likely to prejudice the ĐoŵŵerĐial iŶterests of the ĐouŶĐil or aŶǇ third partǇ .͟  ;EIR applies 
only to the decisions of public bodies not to private developers).
• Reliance upon the exception is always subject to the requirement 
under 12(1)(b) that the public interest in maintaining the exception 
outweighs the public interest in disclosing the information i.e what 
is the balance between the public interest in protecting a legitimate 
economic interest and the public interest in disclosure.  It is for the 
public authority, usually the LPA, to define this public interest and 
assess this balance.
Arguments against full disclosure
• Developer view
• A threat to ͞legitiŵate eĐoŶoŵiĐ iŶterests͟
• It has been independently assessed e.g. by the DV
• Competitors would be placed at an advantage
• Bespoke models are a company secret
• LPA view
• They are democratically elected to make these decisions
• DV has checked it
• Viability assessments are too complicated for the public to understand
• Developers would not be as frank with local authorities
• Disclosure would make it difficult to negotiate
Arguments for Full Disclosure
• Viability model is flawed and needs full exposure and interrogation
• Input and output data are highly contested
• There is a major impact on the level of affordable housing from relatively 
small changes in  the modelling inputs 
• No evidence that full disclosure would damage commercial interests
• Open competition between developers is surely a good thing
• Closed book encourages manipulation
Conclusions: Marketisation of the Planning system
• VA has significance for the whole planning system because it makes the  
individual circumstances of the developer and landowner a material 
consideration;  it undermines statutory local plan policies that apply across a 
local plan area.  Viability places profit above the planning merits of 
development 
• The VA model, because of its weaknesses, requires extra vigilance and 
interrogation;  communities need access their own counter valuation experts; 
• Open book is essential to reveal the secrets of developer/local authority 
partnerships over development plans and schemes
• We must campaign for scrapping VA in plan making and planning control; No 
finessing of the methodology – or open book - can overcome the damage 
caused by VA  
